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The perceived credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the investor perceived credibility of forward-looking performance 
disclosure (FLPDs) in the narrative sections of the annual reports.  Our proxy for these 
disclosures is an index of statements about future performance. We find that companies issue 
more FLPDs when they raise debt or convey bad news in the financial statements in the form of 
earnings declines, missing analyst earnings forecasts and underperforming the industry peers. In 
the presence of these managerial incentives, investors condition the use of FLPDs on the quality 
of earnings reported in the audited financial statements. Our results suggest that firms derive a 
credibility benefit for their narrative disclosures from having a reputation for high quality 
earnings. 
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The perceived credibility of forward-looking performance disclosures 
1. Introduction  
We investigate the investor perceived credibility of forward-looking performance 
disclosure (FLPDs) that managers provide in annual reports. Our proxy for these disclosures is a 
score that counts statements about future performance that managers disclose in the narrative 
sections of the reports. Regulators' interest in the content of these narrative sections has grown 
on the belief that they improve the relevance of corporate reporting (Beattie et al. 2004).  
Empirical evidence so far suggests that indeed FLPDs correlate with stock prices that are more 
informative about future earnings. However, as FLPDs are not immediately verifiable or 
auditable, managers may also use them when they have incentives to be misleading or untruthful. 
The disciplining risk of shareholder litigation might be less operative in this case as FLPDs are 
often qualitative. To guard against misleading performance disclosures, investors may look for 
information quality of the audited financial statements. This provides scope for maintaining high 
quality in reported earnings to enhance the perceived credibility of FLPDs. In this paper we 
explore managerial incentives underlying FLPDs and whether investors condition reliance on 
FLPDs on the quality of reported earnings in the presence of these incentives. 
Annual report narratives in the form of management discussion and analysis sections, 
referred to as the MD&A in most countries and the operating and financial review (OFR) in the 
UK, have been gaining increasing prominence. The formalized structure of these narratives and 
their release in regular intervals make then rank highly as a communication source by different 
groups of stakeholders. We focus on those parts of the narratives that include FLPDs, e.g. the 
chairman’s statement, the CEO’s and CFO’s reviews, and the operating and financial review in 
UK non-financial companies. FLPDs refer to information on expected payoffs from current and 
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future investment plans and structural business changes that enable users to predict a company’s 
future financial performance. In the UK information about current and future trading is typically 
made through such qualitative narrative statements, rather than quantitative management 
earnings forecasts (Schleicher and Walker 2010, Brennan 1999). As FLPDs tend to be qualitative 
in nature, non-time specific and dominated by good news (Bujaki et al. 1999, Clarkson et al. 
1992, Clarkson et al. 1994, Clatworthy and Jones 2003), it is hard for investors to assess their 
credibility. Focusing on UK firms’ disclosure practices is also topical given the increasing efforts 
of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to improve the quality of narrative reporting (FRC 
2012). Our study informs accounting regulators about managerial incentives underlying narrative 
reporting and the safeguards that investors use against soft and less easily verifiable disclosures.  
We measure the frequency of forward-looking performance disclosure using a score that 
counts the number of FLPDs in annual report narrative sections (Hussainey et al. 2003; Li, 2010a; 
Muslu et al. 2012).1 To explore the role of managerial incentives underlying the disclosure of 
FLPDs we draw from voluntary disclosure models (Verrecchia, 1983, Dye, 1986, Wagenhofer, 
1990, Bagnoli and Watts 2007) and prior empirical studies on the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure (Section 2). Our analysis shows that the frequency of FLPDs is part of a ‘sticky’ 
disclosure policy. Controlling for the persistence of FLPDs across years, we find that proprietary 
costs and equity offerings in the current period restrain managers from issuing further FLPDs. 
Managers’ openness about future performance increases with information demands of the 
investment community and when firms issue debt and report bad news in the financial statements, 
                                                 
1 Recent research relies heavily on computer software packages to measure levels of narratives disclosures. These 
include Kothari et al (2009); Feldman et al. (2010); Brown and Tucker (2011); Gruning (2011); Davis et al. (2012). 
For an extensive review on the use of computer-based content analysis to measure levels of disclosure, see Li 
(2010b). We focus on forward-looking earnings statements within narrative disclosures.  
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e.g. earnings declines, falling short of analyst forecasts and underperforming relative to industry 
peers.    
In assessing the perceived credibility of FLPDs we draw from the framework of Mercer 
(2004), who approaches the credibility of management disclosures through the extent that 
investors view the disclosures as ‘believable’. Accordingly we measure the perceived credibility 
of FLPDs through the extent that investors rely on these disclosures.  Prior research on the value 
relevance of FLPDs shows that managers use them to ‘bring the future forward’ as their 
frequency increases the ability of the stock market to anticipate earnings (Schleicher and Walker, 
1999, Hussainey et al., 2003, Schleicher et al, 2007, Hussainey and Walker 2009, Muslu et al. 
2012). We complement this line of research by investigating investors’ reliance of FLPDs in the 
presence of situational incentives that managers have at the time of the disclosure.  By situational 
incentives we mean managers’ incentives to open up about future performance triggered by 
specific events or circumstances, e.g. debt or equity offerings, reporting of bad earnings news 
conveyed in the financial statements. Under these circumstances investors face high uncertainty 
about the credibility of management disclosures, as managers have strong incentives to manage 
performance perceptions. As FLPDs are mostly qualitative and therefore not easily verifiable, it 
is difficult to infer management forecasting reputation. We therefore investigate whether in these 
cases investors provision reliance on FLPDs on earnings quality. By earnings quality we mean 
the precision of the earnings signal emanating from the audited financial statements. This reflects 
managers’ reporting reputation.  
To capture investors’ reliance on FLPDs we assess the effect of FLPDs on the current 
and future earnings information impounded in stock prices. We find that while on average 
FLPDs increase the share price anticipation of future earnings, investors do not rely 
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unconditionally on FLPDs of firms that issue debt or report bad news in the financial statements. 
In the presence of these situational incentives we find that investor reliance on FLPDs depends 
on reported earnings quality, i.e. FLPDs help investors re-assess information in contemporaneous 
earnings and anticipate future earnings only when reported earnings are of high quality. This 
finding is sustained when considering simpler earnings properties (e.g. earnings volatility), 
filtering out the variation of earnings quality that is related to business fundamentals, and 
controlling for other aspects of the firm’s information environment (e.g. analyst following and 
forecast dispersion). We conclude that firms’ reputation for high quality earnings affects the 
perceived credibility of its forward-looking disclosures.  
Our findings contribute to the literature examining the relevance of forward-looking 
disclosures. We demonstrate that investors do not rely unconditionally on FLPDs. When firms 
issue debt or report bad earnings news in the financial statements, investors rely on disclosures of 
firms with higher earnings quality. The insights of our investigation are timely for policy-makers 
and regulators who are currently considering ways to improve communication between 
companies and investors in the annual report narratives (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
2012, FRC 2012). The stock market appears to use information in the audited financial 
statements in deciding how much reliance to place on these narratives. For managers this 
evidence suggests that there is a credibility benefit for the narrative disclosures from having a 
reputation for high quality in reported earnings. This implies an additional incentive for 
managers to invest in earnings quality as part of the firm’s reputational capital. Finally, our study 
contributes to the literature on accounting and disclosure choices.  Our findings corroborate 
evidence on the interaction between reporting and disclosure choices (Bagnoli and Watts 2007, 
Francis et al. 2008), providing additional insights on how investors to extract information from 
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mandatory reporting to decide reliance on ‘softer’ forward-looking disclosures.  Our evidence 
reiterates the need to examine accounting and disclosure choices as part of a general reporting 
and disclosure equilibrium.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Prior Research  
Agency theory motivates voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to reduce information 
asymmetry (Healy and Palepu 2001, Core 2001). Research on forward-looking disclosures has 
largely focused on the quantitative management earnings forecasts provided in press releases.  
This research generally finds that the frequency of management earnings forecasts is higher for 
large firms, firms with less volatile earnings and a long string of meeting analyst forecasts and 
firms issuing securities (Baik and Jiang 2006, Ruland et al., 1990, Lees, 1981, Gibbins et al., 
1990, Lev and Penman, 1990, Frankel et al., 1995, Waymire, 1985, Cox, 1985 and Imhoff, 1978). 
A number of studies also examine forward-looking disclosures that managers provide in annual 
reports and press releases. These studies, often limited to a small sample size (Lakhal, 2005, 
O’Sullivan et al. 2008), use the traditional content analysis approach to count the number of 
sentences containing earnings forecasts in the narrative sections. More recent research that has 
used computer software to measure levels of FLPDs in the annual report narratives, as we do, has 
provided some evidence on the agency considerations underlying such disclosures (Schleicher et 
al. 2007, Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011)).2 We build a framework for the factors affecting the 
frequency of FLPDs that focuses on how earnings news in the audited financial statements 
induces managers to open up about future in their annual report narratives. Our model extends 
                                                 
2 On the determinants of forward-looking disclosure some evidence is also contributed by studies focusing on the 
‘tone’ of forward-looking disclosures. Li (2010a) finds that firms with better current performance, smaller size, less 
return volatility and lower market-to-book ratios issue more positive forward-looking disclosures. Since we examine 
factors affecting managers to be more forward about future performance in their reports, we focus on the frequency 
forward-looking disclosures.     
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existing approaches by incorporating managers’ strategic reporting incentives that prior research 
has used for other types of voluntary disclosures (e.g. Aboody and Kasznik, 1999, Schrand and 
Walther, 2000 and Zechman, 2010).  In the presence of such incentives the issue of the perceived 
credibility of FLPDs becomes crucial.   
In examining the relevance of FLPDs, prior research has focused on the association of 
FLPDs with future performance and the extent that they help investors anticipate future earnings. 
Clarkson et al. (1994) find the inclusion of forward-looking information makes corporate annual 
reports more informative about future performance. Similarly, on a sample of MD&As, Bryan 
(1997) finds that indications of envisaged future operations and capital expenditures are 
associated with future short-term performance. Clarkson et al. (1999) show that changes in the 
level of forward-looking information in the annual reports are also informative as they seem to 
vary with future corporate performance.3  Barron et al. (1999) shed light on the effect of forward-
looking disclosure on the capital markets. They show that MD&A disclosures have a substantial 
impact on analyst earnings forecasts and that higher MD&A scores improve forecast accuracy. 
Bozzolan et al. (2009) find that quantified forward-looking disclosures in annual reports of 
Italian, German, French and Swiss firms cross-listed in the US improve forecast accuracy and 
reduce analyst forecast dispersion. Focusing on investors, Miller and Piotroski (2000) show that, 
for forward-looking disclosure firms stock returns are more correlated with the next period’s 
earnings than for non-disclosure firms. Similarly, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and 
Myers (2002) show that firms with higher AIMR disclosure scores help investors ‘bring the 
future forward’ as they have a higher amount of future earnings news reflected in their current 
                                                 
3 For completeness, we reaffirm the information content of FLPDs by examining their predictive ability for future 
performance. We confirm that FLPDs, and annual changes in FLPDs, are positively associated with future changes 
in profitability. 
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annual returns.4  Schleicher and Walker, (1999), Hussainey et al. (2003), Schleicher et al. (2007), 
Hussainey and Walker (2009), and Muslu et al. (2012) also provide evidence that FLPDs make 
stock returns incorporate future earnings in a more timely fashion. This line of research, has not 
explicitly addressed the credibility issue that arises from the non-verifiable nature of FLPDs in 
the UK.  Jennings (1987) argues that investors’ reactions to managerial disclosures are a function 
of the credibility (‘believability’) of the disclosure. Two companies that are equally forward 
about future performance in their annual report narratives, but not equally ‘believable’, may 
elicit different responses from investors. Prior research identifies management credibility as a 
key factor affecting the credibility of management disclosures as the credibility of a message 
depends on the credibility of the messenger (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979, Mercer 2004, Kothari 
2009). This research draws inferences mainly based on the analysis of quantitative and largely 
verifiable information disclosed by management, the most common type being management 
earnings forecasts issued by US firms and proxies management credibility through forecast 
accuracy. 5  With management forecasts, accuracy can be assessed straightforward through 
subsequent financial statements. Monitoring however the accuracy of FLPDs in the UK is 
difficult given their qualitative nature. Schleicher and Walker (2010) highlight this issue and 
provide evidence that firms with large impending earnings declines bias upwards the tone of 
their FLPDs. This evidence raises suspicion over the role of FLPDs especially in the presence of 
                                                 
4 The Financial Analysts Federation disclosure ratings of the Association for Investment Management Research 
produced the AIMR-FAF ratings by evaluating firms’ disclosures along three dimensions: a) the detail of 
information disclosed in annual published reports b) the detail of information in quarterly reports and c) the 
responsiveness and openness of management to analyst questions. These ratings covered all the various disclosures 
made by firms, including verbal information given during analyst meetings and conference calls.  However, prior 
research using these ratings argues that it is not clear how analysts select firms to be included in the ratings, 
suggesting the existence of a strong bias towards the largest firms in each industry sector. The financial analysts 
federation discontinued the ratings in 1995. 
5 Investors may assess the credibility of management forecasts through ex-post realizations. Consistent with this 
notion, prior research finds that investors rely on earnings forecasts more when firms have provided accurate 
forecasts in the past (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2004, Hutton and Stocken 2007).  
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managerial incentives.  Demers and Vega (2009) suggests that investors’ reliance on soft non-
verifiable information depends on factors related to the firm’s information environment. We 
complement this line of research by investigating how investors’ reliance on FLPDs varies with 
managerial incentives and whether in the presence of these incentives investors use reported 
earnings quality as a safeguard. We focus on earnings quality as a factor of the firm’s 
information environment as it is directly affected by managers, i.e. the ‘messenger’ of FLPDs.   
Drawing from persuasion models, Mercer (2004) argues that investors are less likely to 
rely on management disclosures when managers have incentives to be misleading or untruthful at 
the time of the disclosure. While in the presence of situational incentives managers may use 
FLPDs to release their superior information, they face greater benefits and lower costs from 
providing inaccurate disclosures. Koch (2002) claims that to be the case with firms facing 
financial distress. In a similar notion, Lang and Lundholm (2000) argue that higher disclosures 
before equity offerings reflect managerial attempts to hype the stock rather than reduce 
information asymmetry, as this disclosure is optimistically biased and leads to pre-offer price 
rises and post-offer price declines. So in the presence of situational incentives investors face a 
higher need for inside information, but also higher uncertainty about the credibility of 
management disclosures. In these cases management credibility cues are useful for deciding 
reliance on FLPDs. A historical measure of management’s forecasting accuracy would be hard to 
derive due to the more qualitative and therefore less verifiable nature of FLPDs. In these cases 
the quality of reported earnings in the audited financial statements may offer a useful proxy for 
management credibility, as it reflects management’s reporting reputation and evidence suggests 
that it is aligned with disclosure quality (Francis et al. 2008). We therefore investigate whether 
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investors condition their reliance on FLPDs on earnings quality in the presence of managerial 
incentives.   
 
3. Research design  
3.1 Measuring forward-looking disclosures  
3.1.1 FDSCORE 
To calculate our FLPDs score we use the scoring method developed in Hussainey et al. 
(2003, 276–282).  The authors automate the generation of disclosure scores for large samples of 
UK firms by using Nudist; text analysis software used to analyze interviews, speeches, 
newspaper articles, and text documents.  We focus on annual report narratives, as they are more 
likely to contain voluntary FLPDs and on sections with at least one of the following headings: 
Financial Highlights, Summary Results, Chairman’s Statement, Chief Executive Officer’s 
Review, Operating and Financial Review, Financial Review, Financial Director’s Report, 
Finance Review, Business Review, and Operating Review.  All other sections of the annual 
report are excluded from our analysis.  We focus on performance indicators as they improve the 
stock market’s ability to anticipate future earnings changes (Hussainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et 
al. 2007).   
We construct our disclosure index in three stages.  In the first stage, we identify forward-
looking statements in the narratives by electronically searching the sections for a list of thirty-
five forward-looking keywords such as accelerate, anticipate, await, and coming (financial) 
year(s), etc. Panel A of Table 1 provides detailed lists of the keywords.  We also include future 
year numbers in the list of forward-looking key words.  In the second stage we identify 
performance related keywords.  We trace these keywords in sell-side analyst reports to represent 
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the market’s view about the firm’s disclosure quality.6  For each forward-looking statement in 
analysts’ reports, we identify the key noun in the statement, e.g., profitability, EPS, return, 
margin (see Panel A of Table 1).  In the third stage we count the number of sentences that 
include at least one forward-looking keyword and one performance keyword in the annual report 
narratives. Our FLPDs index, FDSCORE, is the number of intersections divided by the total 
number of sentences in the narrative sections and multiplied by 100.  We introduce scaling to 
control for the general lengthiness of the narrative sections; this way we control by construction 
for factors associated with the firm’s mere ability or willingness to produce lengthier reports (e.g. 
size) rather managerial discretion to open up about future operating performance. Using scaling, 
FDSCORE is bounded by 0 and 100. Our coding scheme is arguably an improvement on binary 
coding as it counts the frequency of FLPDs in the annual report narrative sections, not merely 
their existence. 
   
3.1.2 What do we know about FDSCORE? 
Hussainey et al. (2003) developed their scoring methodology to evaluate the voluntary 
disclosures in the annual report narratives of UK firms. This automated scoring methodology 
allows for sample coverage similar to AIMR-FAF US ratings. To evaluate their scoring methods, 
Hussainey et al. (2003) compare the classifications of the Nudist automated search to a manual 
inspection of the discussion sections of 50 randomly selected annual reports and find that Nudist 
identifies 86 percent of the cases correctly.  The remaining 14 percent are misclassified with 
Type I and II errors of 12 and 2 percent, respectively.  Most errors occur when Nudist misses 
                                                 
6 Analyst reports are highly likely to include the topics that help the stock market to anticipate future earnings 
changes. This is due to financial analyst representing and influencing investor beliefs (Schipper 1991, Lang and 
Lundholm 1996) and to annual reports serving as a key input to drafting analyst reports. Relying on analysts’ view, 
as representative of the market’s view, about the firm’s disclosure policy is also consistent with the use of AIMR-
FAF ratings as a proxy for the firm disclosures.    
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forward-looking information, but any further additions to the forward-looking keywords 
increases the Type II error.  On the firm level the Pearson and Rank correlations between the 
Nudist score and the index constructed by manual inspection are calculated at 0.96 and 0.95.  
To further assess the nature of FDSCORE, we randomly select a sample of 140 forward-
looking performance statements from UK annual reports across our sample period.  Panel B of 
Table 1 presents some of these statements.  Recurring themes in these statements is facts or 
judgments about expected returns from: i) new business segments and divisions; ii) expansion 
programs; iii) restructuring and investment programs; iv) mergers and acquisitions; v) 
development programs vi) investments in technology; vii) exploring growth opportunities; viii) 
new customer contracts; and ix) increased capacity and efficiency.7  The statements contain 
predominately qualitative information about the future with no reference to a specific time 
horizon; we find that only 1 percent of the random sample statements are quantitative in nature. 
Our observations corroborate existing evidence on the dominance of qualitative FLPDs, 
identified either through an automated scoring methodology or manual inspection (Schleicher 
and Walker 2010, Beattie et al. 2004). 
The frequency of FLPDs, unscaled, has been used in a number of studies. In terms of the 
relevance of FLPDs, Hussainey et al. (2003) verify that firms providing more FLPDs in their 
annual reports help the market to predict future earnings changes more accurately.  They also 
show that it is the frequency of forward-looking earnings statements that contribute to price-
leading-earnings rather than forward-looking statements about individual income statement 
                                                 
7 As our analysis focuses on the frequency of FLPDs, i.e. how forthcoming are managers about the future, and not 
their content, we do not perform extensive content analysis on the forward-looking performance statements. To 
assess consistency with prior literature, we only draw some general observations about the content. In our randomly 
selected statements, consistent with the evidence of Bujaki et al. (1999), Clarkson et al. (1992), Clarkson et al. 
(1994), and Clatworthy and Jones (2003), good news appears to dominate bad news. Of the randomly selected 
sample statements, 95 percent contain good news about the future.  Only a few of these statements contain a mixture 
of good and bad news. The bad news component refers to current or past events, leading to the good news 
component with a forward-looking perspective. 
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components (e.g. revenues or costs).  Schleicher et al. (2007) and Hussainey and Walker (2009) 
add to this initial evidence showing that the effect of FLPDs on stock price anticipation of future 
earnings is more pronounced for loss-making and dividend-paying firms.   
3.2 Model of forward-looking disclosures   
We group factors that affect the frequency of FLPDs into four categories; disclosure policy, 
proprietary costs, information environment and situational incentives that exist at the time of the 
disclosure.  This framework builds on existing literature on the drivers of voluntary disclosure 
taking into account the specific nature of forward-looking disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993, 
Healy et al. 1999, Mercer 2005, Baber et al. 2006, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006, Butler et al. 
2007). The detailed form of our model is:  
0 1 1 2 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11
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The Appendix provides detailed definitions of all variables. Below we describe the model 
components. 
Disclosure policy 
Evidence suggests that firms’ disclosures tend to persist across years (Bushee et al. 2003; 
Skinner 2003; Graham et al. 2005). Once managers decide to open up about future performance 
in the narrative sections of the annual report it is unlikely that they switch back to no disclosure. 
To account for the ‘stickiness’ in forward-looking disclosure decisions we include the lagged 
frequency of FLPDs, 1.tFDSCORE   
Proprietary costs 
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There is considerable evidence in the literature suggesting that FLPDs are value relevant. 
However, this type of disclosure might provide useful information to competitors and hence, 
might affect the firm’s competitive position in product markets. Therefore proprietary costs may 
induce managers to be less open about future performance in the annual report narratives.8 Our 
model includes firm size as a proxy for proprietary costs. 9  As FDSCORE controls by 
construction for the general lengthiness of annual reports, firm size is likely to capture 
proprietary considerations rather than the mere ability/willingness of larger firms to produce 
lengthier reports. To the extent larger firms face higher proprietary costs and forces from 
competition, we expect them to issues less FLPDs. 
Information environment 
Management’s disclosure choices are inherently related to the firm’s information environment. 
Early theoretical work by Verrecchia (1983) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) shows that 
voluntary disclosure mitigates information asymmetry and improves the firm’s information 
environment.  Empirical studies verify this theoretical proposition with evidence of a positive 
association between poor information environments and the frequency of voluntary disclosures 
(Imhoff 1978, Waymire 1985, Lang and Lundholm 1993, Tasker 1998). We first consider the 
volatility of the firm’s operations and its growth opportunities as factors shaping the firm’s 
information environment. Accordingly our model includes sales variability (σSALES), and the 
                                                 
8 According to the proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; 
Wagenhofer, 1990) the incentive to voluntarily disclosure information is a decreasing function of proprietary costs 
such as relevant preparation and competitive costs. Consistent with this theory, Jones (2007) finds that higher 
proprietary costs are associated with lower levels of R&D voluntary disclosure. Prencipe (2004) finds that 
proprietary costs also limit the incentive for companies to provide segment information to the market.  
9 We repeat the analysis using the industry concentration ratio as an alternative proxy for proprietary costs, similar to 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006). We measure the industry concentration ratio using the sum of the sales of the four 
largest companies in the industry (in terms of sales) divided by total industry sales. We obtain qualitatively similar, 
yet somewhat weaker, results using this alternative measure. We therefore opt for size in the main specification, 
measured using the company’s market capitalization, as it is seems to a more comprehensive measure of proprietary 
cost considerations.  
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book to market ratio (BM).  Firms with volatile of operations have less predictable income 
streams. Such firms would issue more FLPDs to reduce uncertainty over their future profitability 
and mitigate information asymmetry. To the extent the book to market ratio is an inverse proxy 
for information asymmetry and growth opportunities, we expect firms with higher book to 
market ratios issuing less FLPDs.10  
We also consider factors shaping the firms’ external information environment. Managers 
would be more forthcoming about future performance in their published reports when the 
information demands of the investment community are rising (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006). We 
consider two properties of the information demand of the investment community. The first is the 
size of the demand, which we capture using the number of analysts following the company. The 
second is the market’s uncertainly about the firm’s future potential which we capture through the 
dispersion in the analyst earnings forecasts. Higher forecast dispersion would induce managers to 
provide more forward-looking disclosures to resolve market uncertainty by guiding the forecast 
consensus. Accordingly, our model includes the number of analysts following the firm (NANAL) 
and the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts during the year (DISPERSION).  Consistent with 
prior research (i.e. Lang and Lundholm, 1993), we expect that NANAL and DISPERSION to be 
positively associated with the frequency of FLPDs. 
Situational incentives  
These are incentives that managers have at the time of the disclosure to open up about future 
performance triggered by specific events or circumstances, e.g. the firm’s activity in the capital 
markets (debt or equity offerings) or earnings news conveyed in the financial statements. 
                                                 
10 Barclay and Smith (1995), McLaughlin et al. (1998), Barth and Kasznik (1999) and Huddart and Ke (2007) also 
use the book to market measure as a proxy for information asymmetry.   
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We first consider incentives arising from corporate financing transactions. Information 
asymmetry considerations are higher when firms raise capital (Healy and Palepu 2001), 
suggesting a higher need for voluntary disclosure during equity offerings. Consistent with this 
notion, empirical studies show that firms offering securities are more likely to issue earnings 
forecasts (e.g. Choi. 1973, Ruland et al, 1990, Healy et al. 1999) and have higher analyst ratings 
of disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). While this evidence suggests a positive association 
between voluntary disclosure and equity offerings, this might not extend to FLPDs disclosed in 
the narrative sections of the annual report. On periods of equity offerings companies might prefer 
to communicate forward-looking information directly with major investors (Healy and Palepu 
1993, 1995) or through more timely channels of communication (e.g. IPO or SEO prospectuses 
earnings releases, conference calls).  During these periods potential legal liability and reputation 
concerns might also deter FLPDs due to their high price sensitive nature.  Consistent with this 
notion, Li (2009) finds that the threat of shareholder litigation gives managers incentives to 
partiality disclose private prospective information during initial public offerings. To control for 
the effect of equity offerings on FLPDs, our model includes an indicator variable of share capital 
increases by more than 5 percent during the year (SEO).  
Turning to external financing, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that highly leveraged 
firms have high monitoring/agency costs. These firms can reduce these costs by providing 
voluntary disclosure in their annual report narratives to convey value relevant information that 
satisfy creditors’ needs. Consistent with this prediction, Sengupta (1998) finds that greater 
disclosure reduces the cost of issuing debt. In this vein, managers may provide more FLPSs 
when issuing debt to reduce financing costs and the required risk premiums. This implies a 
positive association between issuing debt and the frequency of FLPDs.  To account for the effect 
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of debt issues on FLPDs, our model includes an indicator variable of increases in the book value 
of debt by more than 5 percent during the year (DEBTISSUES). 
Second we consider incentives arising from earnings news reported in the financial 
statements. Bagnoli and Watts (2007) examine voluntary disclosure as a response to managers 
having private information the market can use to better estimate the value implications of the 
content of the financial report. In their model the content of the financial reports affects both the 
possibility and frequency of voluntary disclosure. They show that if the financial report contains 
sufficiently bad news, the manager discloses more private information to mitigate investors’ 
downward response to a negative earnings surprise. Consistent with this notion, Schleicher et al. 
(2007) find that loss firms provide more informative FLPDs in their annual report narratives. We 
use four measures of ‘earnings news’ in the financial statements. Prior literature establishes three 
important earnings benchmarks for managers; earnings for the prior period, analyst forecasts, and 
profits (Degeorge 1999, Brown 2001, Brown and Caylor 2005, Graham et al. 2005).  To capture 
bad earnings news in the financial statements, we include an indicator of earnings declines 
(DECLINE), missing of the analyst forecasts (MISS) and losses (LOSS).   If the firm’s reported 
performance falls below expectations, managers are likely to issue FLPDs in the narratives to 
mitigate the markets’ response.  Bagnoli and Watts (2007) also suggest that the extent of firm’s 
underperformance may also affect the probability of voluntary disclosure, because the benefits 
from mitigating bad news are greater the further the firm’s performance deviates from market’s 
expectations. Accordingly we include a measure of underperformance, capturing the industry 
average return on assets (ROA) exceeds the firm’s ROA (UNDERPERFORMANCE).   
If investors rely more on FLPDs of firms with high earnings quality, it is possible that 
earnings quality affects also directly the frequency of FLPDs, i.e. firms with higher earnings 
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quality disclose more FLPDs. This is in line with the empirical evidence of Lennox and Park 
(2006) who find that firms with higher earnings informativeness issue more frequently earnings 
forecasts, and Francis et al. (2008) who find that firms with higher earnings quality have higher 
disclosure scores. Our model therefore also includes earnings quality (EQ).  
3.3 Investors’ reliance on forward-looking disclosures   
Prior research investigating the relevance of forward-looking disclosures focuses on the 
extent that these disclosures help investors ‘bring the future forward’, i.e. assist the stock market 
to anticipate earnings (Hussainey et al, 2003; Schleicher et al, 2007; Hussainey and Walker, 
2009; Muslu et al, 2012). To investigate how investors’ use of FLPDs varies with managers 
situational incentives, we start by examining the extent that FLPDs affect stock price 
informativeness about current and future earnings. We adopt the model of Collins et al. (1994) 
adding future earnings growth to return-earnings models as follows,   
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 1 5 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t tR X R EP AG e                                               (2) 
where Xt is the growth in earnings per share for year t and Xt3 is the sum of earnings growth for 
years t+1 to t+3, Rt3 is the aggregate stock return in year t+1 to t+3. Equation (2) models 
contemporaneous returns on current and future earnings shocks.11  The specification includes 
contemporaneous and future returns, lagged earnings-to-price ratio and asset growth to account 
for the measurement error arising from using ex-post earnings growth to proxy for shocks in 
future earnings expectations.12  EPt−1 is earnings in period t−1 over price at the start of period t, 
                                                 
11 The framework of this model has its theoretical underpinning in the discounted cash flows valuation model, 
assuming that investors’ revisions in dividend expectations are fully summarized by their revisions in future 
earnings expectations.  
12 Collins et al (1994) include errors-in-variables proxies such as lagged earnings yield, current asset growth, and 
future period returns to mitigate the measurement error problems. They argue that the inclusion of such proxies will 
affect the goodness of fit of the model, only if the reason for the poor performance of the simple return-earnings 
regression is prices leading earnings. Panel C, Table 2 shows that the correlations between these variables are 
 19
while AGt is the growth rate of total book value of assets in period t.  Similar to Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) we refer to the coefficients on contemporaneous earnings growth as the earnings 
response coefficient (ERC) and that on future earnings growth as the future ERC, FERC. Both 
are predicted to be positive. As we wish to assess the impact of FLPDs on investors’ assessments 
of contemporaneous earnings (ERC) and their anticipation of future earnings (FERC), we 
augment the model allowing the ERC and FERC to vary with the frequency of FLPDs as 
follows:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 1 5 , 6 ,
7 , , 14 , , 3 ,               + .
  
      
 
        
   
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
R R EP AG FDSCORE
FDSCORE FDSCORE u                               (3) 
In this specification 1  and 2  capture the ERC and FERC irrespective of the frequency of 
FLPDs.  If investors use FLPDs to re-assess information in reported earnings, we expect FLPDs 
to increase the ERC.  If investors rely on FLPDs to improve anticipation of future earnings, we 
expect FLPDs to increase FERC. To investigate how investors’ use of FLPDs varies with 
situational incentives we repeat equation (3) for subset of firms-year observations where 
managers have incentives to be more open about future performance in the annual reports.  
To investigate how investor reliance on FLPDs varies with earnings quality we repeat 
equation (3) distinguishing between firms with high and low earnings quality. We measure 
earnings quality using the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) 
and extended to control for operating performance (Kothari et al. 2005) and the role of accruals 
in asymmetric timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). The standard deviation of the 
model residuals, EQ, provides an inverse measure of earnings quality, i.e. larger EQ implies 
                                                                                                                                                             
relatively small, with the largest correlation being between future earnings and future returns (35%). Such a 
correlation is anticipated (see Lev 1989). 
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lower earnings quality. We therefore classify firms with high (low) earnings quality if EQ is 
below (above) the industry and year median. 
4. Sample    
Our sample of companies comprises the FTSE All Share non-financial UK firms. As Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2008), we exclude financial firms because of their regulation of disclosure of 
forward-looking information. A requirement for using Nudist is the availability of annual reports 
in electronic form and in text format.  We collect electronic versions of the UK annual reports for 
the years 1996 to 2007.  We start collecting annual reports from 1996 because large cross-
sections of electronic UK annual reports are available on Dialog database from year 1996. 
Dialog stores reports in standard text format, deleting images and graphs, and retaining all text 
and numbers. The database was discontinued by Thomson Financial in mid-2004 after 
comprehensive coverage for year 2002. To collect electronic versions of annual reports for the 
period 2003-2007, we use the Northcote Database (http://www.northcote.co.uk). Northcote 
offers annual reports in a PDF format. We convert these reports to standard text format, deleting 
images and graphs, and retaining all text and numbers. We end our analysis in the year 2007 
because the UK Companies Act 2006 standardized the contents of the Business Review and this 
report overlaps in content with the OFR.13  The total number of annual reports of all UK listed 
non-financial companies collected over the period 1996–2007 is 10,095.  Retaining observations 
with available accounting and analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S to estimate our 
model of forward-looking disclosures reduces the sample to reduces the sample to 5,459 
                                                 
13 UK quoted companies should follow the enhanced business review reporting requirements in section 417 of the 
Companies Act 2006 for years beginning on or after 1 October 2007. Section 417 of the Companies Act 2006 sets 
out the required contents of the business review that companies need to include as part of their directors’ report for 
financial years beginning on or after 1 October 2007. The content of the business review is quite similar to the 
content of an OFR statement. For more details see http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/technical/operating.cfm. 
 21
observations for 1,273 UK listed non-financial firms. For price-leading earnings tests availability 
of three years ahead earnings and returns data from Datastream reduces the number of usable 
observations to 4,321. To mitigate the effect of outliers in our tests, we winsorize the top and 
bottom 0.5 percent of all variables used in our tests. 
5. Empirical Results  
5.1 Descriptive statistics   
Panel A of Table 2 reports the statistics for the variables.  The mean FDSCORE is 2.82, 
which indicates that about three out of every 100 sentences in the annual report are FLPDs. This 
translates into approximately seven FLPDs on average per annual report based upon a mean 
count of 235 sentences in annual report narratives in our sample.  The maximum number of 
FLPDs in the narratives is 31 (13 per 100 sentences), while the minimum is zero.  Our sample 
comprises mainly larger firms evident in the high average market capitalization and an average 
of seven analysts following a firm. This sample attribute is similar to prior studies investigating 
the value relevance of FLPDs (Hussainey et al., 2003, Schleicher et al, 2007, Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009).  In our sample the frequency of equity offerings is 17%, while that of debt issues 
is 45%.  Consistent with prior research firms missing earnings targets are a minority ranging 
from 38% of firms reporting earnings declines, to 40% missing analyst forecasts and only 12% 
reporting losses during the sample period.  Our sample firms on average over-perform their 
industry peers as mean UNDERPERFORMANCE is negative (−0.080).  The mean annual returns 
for year t (Rt) are 9.2 percent.  The median annual returns are 9% and their standard deviation is 
0.471. Mean change in EPS for year t scaled by lagged price (Xt) is 0.010 with a standard 
deviation of 0.188, while the average aggregate change in EPS three years ahead scaled by 
lagged price is 0.002 with a standard deviation of 0.296.   
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Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency of FLPDs across situational incentives. 
Managers of firms that issue equity (SEO=1) issue less FLPDs on average in their annual reports. 
Firms issuing debt (DEBTISSUES=1) however issue more FLPDs.  The same holds for firms 
conveying bad news about their performance in the income statement, i.e. earnings that fall short 
of last year earnings (DECLINE=1), of the analyst forecast outstanding at the earnings 
announcement date (MISS=1) and the average industry performance (UNDERPERORM=1). The 
differences in the frequency of FLPDs for these firms compared to the remaining firms in the 
sample are statistically significant. The panel also reports the frequency of FLPDs for firms 
facing multiple situational incentives among debt issues, earnings declines, missing analyst 
forecasts and underperformance relative to industry peers.  Firms facing all four situational 
incentives seem to be the most forward-looking issuing on average 9 FLPDs (3.563 per 100 
sentences x 235 sentences per report) in their annual report, compared to 6 (2.529 per 100 
sentences x 235 sentences per report) FLPDs  issued by firms not facing any of these incentives.  
Panel C of Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations (above and below the 
diagonal) between key variables. As expected, there is a significant positive association between 
firm size and analyst following (0.82), which justifies the univariate negative association 
between analyst following and FLPDs. Among situational incentives there is a positive 
association between corporate financing events, i.e. equity offerings and debt issues, and a strong 
positive association between the measures of bad news in the financial statements, i.e. earnings 
declines, missing of analyst forecasts, losses and underperformance relative to industry peers. 
The latter associations suggest that managers may face multiple situational incentives at the time 
of the disclosure. We take this into account when examining the relevance of FLPSs in the 
presence of situational incentives.  
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5.2 What drives forward-looking performance disclosures?    
Table 3 reports regression results for the factors influencing the frequency of FLPDs 
(equation 1). The first column reports the results of equation (1) excluding FDSCOREt-1, 
therefore highlighting the cross-sectional effects. FDSCORE is negatively associated to SIZE and 
SEO and positively associated to BM, DEBTISSUES, DECLINE, MISS and 
UNDERPERFORMANCE. With regards to size, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) find a positive 
association with FLPDs using total assets as a proxy for size. Their finding is consistent with 
their hypothesis that larger firms have enough resources to provide lengthy narrative sections in 
their annual reports. We control for this effect when constructing our FLPDs index as we scale 
FLPDs with total number of sentences in the narrative sections. Therefore the negative 
association between FDSCORE and SIZE in our specification is likely to reflect proprietary cost 
considerations. With respect to equity offerings, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
advises listed companies to be wary of making unintentional profit projections ahead of equity 
offerings which could discourage managers from being overly open about future performance in 
these periods.14 In summary, the results of the first column suggest that across the section of UK 
firms FLPDs decrease with proprietary costs and equity offerings, and increase with the book to 
market ratio, debt issues, reporting of earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and 
underperformance relative to their industry peers. These factors explain approximately 18% of 
the variation in the frequency of FLPDs.   
In the next column we include FDSCOREt-1 and as expected FLPDs persist over time. 
The explanatory power of the specification rises substantially to 26%. As we control for the 
                                                 
14 With respect to equity offerings we also test the variation in FDSCORE in the year prior to equity offerings, i.e. 
redefining SEO as an indicator of increases in equity in the following period. In this additional test the effect of 
equity offerings is insignificant. For US firms, Lang and Lundholm (2000) also find no change in the frequency of 
forward-looking statements prior to equity offerings and attribute this to the SEC explicitly discouraging forecasts 
prior to registering the offering.      
 24
firm’s disclosure policy, these results highlight the factors driving changes in FLPDs across time. 
In this specification NANAL is positive and significant, consistent with analyst following 
triggering additional disclosures of FLPDs. 15   BM is positively associated to FDSCORE. This 
might be due to the endogenous nature of BM as more FLPDs reduce information asymmetry 
and the book to market divergence. To investigate this issue further, we repeat the analysis 
adding BMt-1 in our model. The next column reports the regression results. BMt-1 is negatively 
associated with FDSORE while BM retains the positive association. These results suggest a 
feedback loop between FLPDs and the book-to-market divergence; higher divergence induces 
managers to open up about future performance in the narrative sections of their annual reports, 
and this openness subsequently reduces information asymmetry, consistent with our claims.16  
Taken together, the results of Table 3 show that FLPDs are part of a ‘sticky’ disclosure 
policy. Controlling for the persistence of FLPDs across years, we find that proprietary costs and 
equity offerings in the current period restrain managers from issuing further statements. 
Managers provide more FLPDs to reduce the book-to-market divergence and respond to higher 
information demands of the investment community –i.e. high analyst following.  In terms of 
situational incentives, FLPDs increase when firms issue debt or convey bad news in their 
financial statements, in the form of earnings declines and falling short of analyst forecasts and 
average industry performance. We next investigate how the market responds to FLPDS in the 
presence of these managerial incentives.  
                                                 
15 Causality may be an issue with analyst following, as it may be that firms issuing more FLPDs have lower 
information acquisition costs and therefore attract more financial analysts. To mitigate this concern, we repeat the 
analysis adding lagged NANAL and the effect remains positive and significant.   
16 The remaining firm-specific characteristics, e.g. σSALES, DISPERSION, LOSS, EQ do not significantly affect 
forward-looking performance disclosures in any of the specifications. The effect of σSALES and EQ are subsumed 
by industry dummies, as in a specification excluding these dummies both variables are significant and with the 
predicted signs. As σSALES and EQ measure earnings volatility and earnings quality using a four-year window, they 
are more likely to explain cross-sectional variation in FDSCORE that is largely correlated with industry variation. 
The effect of LOSS is subsumed by DECLINE and MISS, as losses are highly correlated with declines in profitability 
and missing of analyst forecasts.  
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5.2 The perceived credibility of forward-looking disclosure   
Table 4 presents results on the extent that FLPDs affect stock price informativeness about 
current and future earnings (equation 3). The coefficient on Xt is positive and highly significant 
(0.543, 4.41),t  yielding a strong earnings response coefficient (ERC).  The coefficient on Xt3 is 
however insignificant, suggesting that prices do not lead earnings by three periods. Additional 
untabulated analysis on disaggregated future earnings changes shows that this is due to prices 
leading earnings one year ahead, but to a much lesser extent for two and three periods ahead 
(similar to evidence by Hussainey et al. 2003).  The insignificance of the effect of Xt3 may be 
also due to share price anticipation of future earnings varying with the frequency of FLPDs as we 
see next. The next column presents the results of equation (3). The coefficient on 
3 tFDSCORE X  is positive and marginally significant (0.024, 1.65),t  consistent with FLPDs 
increasing the FERC, i.e. the share price anticipation of future earnings.  To shed further light on 
the interpretation of this result, we test a specification without interaction terms distinguishing 
between firms with high and low FDSCORE (splitting using the sample median). The coefficient 
on 3tX  is positive and significant (0.155, 2.00),t  only when FDSCORE is above the sample 
median. When FDSCORE is below the sample median, 3tX  is insignificant.  So it is only higher 
frequencies of FLPDs in annual report narratives that enable stock prices to impound more 
information about future earnings. Table 4 shows how investors’ use of FLPDs varies for firms 
that issue debt or convey bad news in their financial statements in the form of earnings declines, 
missing analyst forecasts, or underperforming relative to industry peers. FLPDs appear to 
marginally affect share price anticipation of future earnings when firms report declines in 
profitability (DECLINE=1, 0.030, 1.89).t  In the presence of all other situational incentives 
3 tFDSCORE X  is insignificant (t-statistics range from 1.16 to 1.59). The results suggest some 
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sort of skepticism towards FLPDs when disclosed by managers facing situational incentives at 
the time of the disclosure. Investor skepticism seems to evolve also around contemporaneously 
reported earnings as tX is also insignificant for firms facing situational incentives. We next 
investigate whether in these cases investors base their reliance on earnings quality.  
Table 5 reports the regression results of equation (3) distinguishing between firms with 
high and low earnings quality. Given that EQ is an inverse measure of earnings quality, we 
classify firms with high (low) earnings quality if EQ is below (above) the industry and year 
median.  For completeness, the first two columns show the unconditional effect of earnings 
quality on the relevance of FLPDs on the entire sample.  tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X   
are positive and significant only for firms with higher earnings quality (t-statistics 2.32 and 1.77).  
In the presence of situational incentives, and particularly when firms issue debt 
(DEBTISSUES=1), report earnings declines (DECLINE=1), or earnings that fall short of the 
analyst forecasts (MISS=1) or average industry performance (UNDERPERFORM=1) 
3 tFDSCORE X  is positive and significant only for firms with higher earnings quality (t-
statistics range from 1.65 to 3.14). In most of these cases, and particularly within firms that miss 
analyst forecasts,  tFDSCORE X  is also positive and significant (t-statistics range from 1.80 to 
3.34), consistent with FLPDs increasing the informativeness of current year earnings for these 
firms. These results suggest that investors use FLPDs to re-assess information in 
contemporaneous earnings and anticipate future earnings, only when reported earnings quality is 
high. In the last column we repeat the analysis for firms facing at least two situational incentives 
and obtain stronger results. This suggests that investors are particularly cautious when firms face 
multiple situational incentives, conditioning their reliance on earnings quality. At the same time 
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it suggests a credibility benefit for narrative disclosures when managers have an established 
reputation for high quality earnings in their financial statements.  
5.3 Additional analyses   
5.3.1 Earnings quality as a gauge of management credibility    
We ran the analysis of Table 5 through various sensitivity tests. For brevity we report in Table 6 
the results for firms facing at least two situational incentives, but we obtain similar inferences for 
firms facing individual situational incentives. In our first test we repeat the analysis using 
earnings variability as an alternative earnings quality measure. Earnings variability has been 
shown to work as an instrument for various earnings quality measures, such as earnings 
smoothness, earnings predictability, and poor matching of revenue and expenses (Francis et al. 
2004, Dichev and Tang 2009), that are closely related to management credibility.  The first two 
columns of Table 6 report the regression results.  tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X  are 
positive and significant only for firms with low earnings volatility (t-statistics 2.39, 1.89).  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005) show that the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) earnings quality measure, that we use for our main test, is a function of both 
business fundamentals and managerial intent. To the extent earnings quality is driven by the 
company’s business model, it is not likely to serve as a gauge for management credibility and 
therefore not affect investors’ reliance on FLPDs. To address this issue, we regress our earnings 
quality measure on the seven variables proxying for business fundamentals as identified by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005), i.e. size, cash flow volatility, sales 
volatility, operating cash cycle, cumulative losses, intangible assets intensity and capital assets 
intensity. As in Francis et al. (2005), we obtain the regression residuals as a proxy for 
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discretionary earnings quality, i.e. the part of earnings quality that is more likely to reflect 
managerial intent. The next two columns of Table 6 report the regression results. 
 tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X  remaining positive and significant only for firms with high 
discretionary earnings quality (t-statistics 2.94, 2.19), consistent with this part of earnings quality 
being the defining factor investors’ reliance on FLPDs.     
Among factors relating to the firm’s information environment, we focus on earnings 
quality as it is directly affected by managers, i.e. the ‘messenger’ of FLPDs. As UK firms do not 
provide information about their future trading through earnings forecasts releases, forecasting 
reputation cannot be used to assess whether FLPDs are credible. It is, however, possible that 
investors evaluate other aspects of the firm’s information environment in deciding their reliance 
on FLPSs. One such aspect might be the assurance provided by financial intermediaries such as 
financial analysts. Mercer (2004) argues that financial analysts might serve as are a source of 
external assurance for management disclosures. Evidence, largely anecdotal, suggests that 
financial analysts do indeed affect the weigh investors place on management disclosures. To test 
whether analyst coverage affects investor reaction to management disclosures, we repeat our 
analysis distinguishing between firms with low and high analyst coverage. We split the sample 
based on the sample median of five analysts. The next two columns of Table 6 report the 
regression results.   tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X  are not significant in either column 
consistent with analyst coverage not affecting investors reliance on FLPDs in the presence of 
situational incentives.   
Another consideration relating to the firm’s information environment is the role of the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure when considering the relevance of FLPDs. To the extent 
there is an omitted aspect of the firm disclosures that is also used to ‘bring the future forward’ as 
 29
FLPDs, if positively correlated with FLPDs it could lead to erroneous inferences.  There is a 
large body of literature that argues and shows that FLPDs increase the amount of future earnings 
news reflected in current stock returns (Hussainey et al. 2003, Schleicher et al. 2007, Hussainey 
and Walker 2009, Muslu et al. 2009). This effect is conceptually grounded on the nature of 
FLPDs, i.e. their forward-looking perspective and explicit reference to profits. While annual 
report narratives contain other types of voluntary disclosure, FLPDs are those expected to be 
behind the price leading earnings association for UK firms. Hussainey et al. (2003) verify this 
empirically with evidence that only FLPDs, and not other types of disclosures in the annual 
report, help investors anticipate future earnings.  So the concern relates mainly to the extent UK 
firms use another channel to communicate information other than annual report narratives and 
that other channel is correlated with FLPDs. Prior evidence suggests that this is unlikely to be the 
case as in the UK firms typically communicate information about future profits through annual 
report narratives (Schleicher and Walker 2010, Brennan 1999). To mitigate this concern further, 
we test how our results vary with proxies associated with the firm disclosures. As there is no 
single score rating UK’s firm overall voluntary disclosure, we use a market-based measure 
associated with firm disclosures, analyst forecasts dispersion (DISPERSION). Dispersion in 
analyst forecasts reflects the overall level of uncertainty within the investment community and 
has been found to be negatively associated with firm disclosure proxies (Healy et al. 2001). It 
therefore offers an inverse proxy for the overall disclosure level that is well suited for our 
purposes as it is also not based on stock returns.17 To test whether FLPDs have an incremental 
effect on the price leading earnings association we first repeat our tests adding DISPERSION as 
an additional control. The next two columns of Table 6 report the results. Both  tFDSCORE X  
                                                 
17 Bid-ask spreads have been also found to be negatively associated with firm disclosures (Healy et al. 2001), 
offering an alternative inverse proxy for disclosure quality. However as they are inherently associated with stock 
returns we do not use them in our additional tests so that the results are not hardwired.  
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and 3 tFDSCORE X  remain positive and significant for the firms with high earnings quality (t-
statistics 1.88, 2.70), consistent with analyst forecast dispersion not subsuming the main effect of 
FLPDs. As earnings quality is also positively correlated with firm disclosures, and therefore 
analyst forecast dispersion, we next test whether DISPERSION can equally explain the 
differential weights on FLPDs. We expect analyst forecast dispersion to be a noisier proxy of 
management credibility than earnings quality as it affected by the efficiency and incentives of 
information intermediaries. In the final two columns of Table 6 we repeat the analysis 
distinguishing between firms with low and high analyst forecast dispersion (DISPERSION). 
 tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X  are not significant in either column, consistent with 
analyst forecast dispersion not affecting investors reliance on FLPDs.      
In summary, Table 6 shows that our core finding is sustained when considering simpler 
earnings properties such as earnings volatility and filtering out the variation of earnings quality 
that is related to business fundamentals. Other aspects of the firm’s information environment that 
are arguably less informative about the credibility of management disclosures compared to 
earnings quality, such as financial analyst coverage or the analyst forecast dispersion, do not 
appear to affect investors reliance on FLPDs. Overall, these results reaffirm our conclusion that 
investors condition reliance on FLPDs on earnings quality in the presence of situational 
incentives, lending further credence on the use of earnings quality as a gauge of management 
credibility. 
5.3.2 Forecasting versus reporting reputation     
While it is hard to monitor the accuracy of FLPDs due to their qualitative nature, over time 
investors could build an estimate of the extent that FLPDs map into future operating performance. 
If an evaluation of the firm’s forecasting reputation is feasible in the long-term, investors’ 
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confidence in management disclosures shall be rising over time. To test this assertion, we 
examine whether investor reliance on FLPDs increases over time for a balanced sample of firms 
with at least five years of being listed and therefore a sufficient record of annual reports.  To 
capture inter-temporal variation in the relevance of FLPDs we introduce a time trend, TIME, and 
interact it with both  tFDSCORE X  and 3 tFDSCORE X . To the extent investor reliance on 
FLPDs rises with the track record of annual report narratives, we expect the interaction term to 
be positive. Table 7 reports the regression results for the balanced sample. As expected,  
3 tFDSCORE X TIME  is positive and significant, suggesting that reliance on FLPDs to 
anticipate future earnings is increasing over time. 
To the extent management forecasting and reporting reputation are alternative cues of 
management credibility, relying on a track record of annual narratives to evaluate management’s 
forecasting reputation will be more pronounced within firms with low quality of reported 
earnings. To test this assertion, we repeat the analysis distinguishing between firms with high 
and low earnings quality. The next two columns of Table 7 report the regression results.  
3 tFDSCORE X TIME  is indeed positive and significant only for firms with low earnings 
quality.18 So for firms facing issues with financial reporting quality, investors rely on FLPDs to 
anticipate future earnings only as the record of the annual report narratives increases enabling 
assessments management forecasting reputation. We view these results as reinforcing our core 
finding that earnings quality enhances reliance on FLPDs, shedding light on the compensating 
effect of time as means for building an estimate of management forecasting reputation. 
 
                                                 
18 We note that FDSCORE x Xt x TIME is negative for firms with high earnings quality, suggesting that investor 
reliance on FLPDs to reassess contemporaneously reported earnings declines over time for these firms. This might 
reflect the declining scope for using FLPDs to explain contemporaneous performance for firms whose reported 
earnings are already of high quality.   
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the perceived credibility of forward-looking performance 
disclosure that managers provide in their annual reports. We find that other than the firm’s 
disclosure policy and information environment, the frequency of this disclosure depends on 
managerial incentives at the time of the disclosure. Managers seem to be more forward about 
future performance in their annual reports during years where the company issues debt or reports 
bad earnings news in the financial statements. In the presence of these managerial incentives, 
investors do not seem to rely on FLPDs unconditionally; they use forward-looking disclosure to 
appraise both current and future performance only when reported earnings in the audited 
financial statements are of high quality.  
Our results have important implications for managers and policy makers.  For managers, 
they provide insights into the strategies they might follow to increase the extent to which stock 
prices impound their private information disclosed in the narratives. Developing a reputation for 
high quality of earnings in the audited financial statements appears to make forward-looking 
disclosure more credible to investors.  For policy makers who consider broadening the scope for 
disclosures of forward-looking information in annual report narratives, our evidence suggests 
that investors mitigate the risk of resource misallocation by conditioning their reliance on this 
information on their assessments of the firm’s earnings quality.  A further important insight from 
our findings is that the drivers and usefulness of voluntary disclosure, especially of ‘soft’ 
unverifiable information, cannot be examined in isolation from the contents and properties of 
mandatory reporting. There is a meaningful interaction between the front end of the financial 
reports and the financial statement that could enhance our understanding of managers’ disclosure 
choices and offer insights to regulators on how to improve corporate reporting.  
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Appendix 
Definition of variables (in alphabetical order)
Variable Definition 
AG The growth rate of total book value of assets in period t. 
BM Book (DS307) to market (DSHMV) ratio. 
CFO Operating cash flows (DS1015) scaled by lagged total assets. 
DebtIssues  Equals one if total debt (DS1301) increases by more than 5 percent during the year, zero 
otherwise. 
DECLINE Equals one if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is negative, zero otherwise. 
DISPERSION Standard deviation of analyst forecasts during the accounting period scaled by the absolute 
value of actual earnings. 
EP I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share for year t−1 divided over beginning of year 
share price. 
EQ The standard deviation of a firms’ abnormal working capital accruals calculated over years 
t−4 through t. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model 
extended with return on assets (Kothari et al. 2005), and negative changes in cash flows to 
account for the role of accruals in timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar 2006).  
FDSCORE The number of forward-looking performance statements included in the annual report 
narratives divided by the total number of sentences in the annual report narrative sections 
and multiplied by 100.   
,CFOi t
I   Equals one when itCFO  is negative, zero otherwise. 
LOSS Equals one if in I/B/E/S actual EPS is negative in the current accounting period, 0 
otherwise.   
MISS Equals one if the earnings surprise (SURP) is negative, zero otherwise. 
NANAL Number of analysts following the firm over the accounting period (source: I/B/E/S). 
UNDERPERFORMA
NCE 
Average industry ROA minus firm-specific ROA. ROA is earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (DS1502) over total assets (DS392). 
UNDERPERFORM Equals one if UNDERPERFORMANCE is positive (i.e. the firm underperforms compared 
its industry peers), 0 otherwise.  
Rt Buy-and-hold returns from eight months before end of financial year t to four months after 
the end of financial year t. 
Rt3 Buy-and-hold returns from eight months before the financial year-end to four months after 
the financial year-end for years t+1 to t+3. 
SEO  Equals one if the share capital (DS301) increases by more than 5 percent during the year, 
zero otherwise.  
SIZE Log of market value of equity (DSHMV).   
SURP Earnings surprise calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the forecast 
outstanding at the earnings announcement date for year t.  
WCA Working capital accruals measured as change in total current assets (DS376) net of change 
in cash (DS375), minus change in current liabilities (DS389) net of change in the current 
portion of long-term debt (DS309). 
Xt The annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS from year t to t+1 scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the year t.  
Xt3 The sum of annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS for years t+1 to t+3 scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the year t.   
ΔCFO Annual change in CFO.  
ΔCR Change in revenue (DS104) minus change in accounts receivable (DS287).  
σSALES The standard deviation of total sales (DS104) over the accounting periods t-t−2. 
DS = Datastream code   
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Table 1: Forward-looking performance disclosure 
Panel A: Stages for constructing index of forward-looking performance disclosure FDSCORE  
   
Stage 1: Identifying forward-looking keywords  
 
  Accelerate 
  Anticipate 
  Await  
  Coming (financial) years 
  Coming months 
  Confidence, Confident)  
  Convince  
  Current (financial) year 
  Envisage 
 
Estimate 
Eventual  
Expect 
Forecast  
Forthcoming  
Hope  
Intend, Intention  
Likely, Unlikely  
Look forward, Look ahead 
 
Next 
Novel  
Optimistic 
Outlook 
Planned, Planning  
Predict 
Prospect  
Remain  
Renew 
Scope for, Scope to 
Shall 
Shortly  
Should  
Soon  
Will  
Well placed, Well positioned  
Year(s) ahead 
    
Stage 2: Identifying performance related keywords from analyst reports  
 
  Benefit 
  Break even  
  Budget  
Contribution  
Earnings  
EPS 
Loss  
Margin  
Profit   
Profitability  
Return  
Trading  
 
Stage 3: Count the intersections between forward-looking and performance related keywords, scaling the intersections by  
               the total number of sentences in the annual report and multiply by 100.  
 
Panel B: Sample of forward-looking performance statements  
 
Statement  
Source  
(Year of annual report) 
‘Management is confident that, with the launch of its new division “The Film Factory at 
VTR”, the company is now well placed to capture a large stake of these special effects 
commercials and feature film market which will ensure the company’s continuing growth 
in profitability.’  
VTR PLC (1996) 
‘Of the three divisions, RCO Healthcare is attracting the highest level of investment and 
offers considerable prospects for good returns in the medium and long term.’  
RCO Holdings PLC (1996)  
‘We intend to increase profits both by a controlled programme of organic expansion and 
by improving the performance of the existing units.’  
Vardon PLC (1996) 
‘We believe that the restructuring and investment programme will restore profitability to 
the group and strengthen our position in the market place.’  
Stoddard Sekers International 
PLC (1996) 
‘Its merger into Montgomery will provide an opportunity for profits recovery in future 
years.’  
Macfarlane Group 
(Clansman) PLC (1996) 
‘We will continue to invest to improve the business and to translate the many opportunities 
available to us into good returns for our shareholders.’  
FirstBus PLC (1997) 
‘The Directors believe that the Company is now well positioned to support further growth 
which should result in a consequent improvement in operating margin.’  
Stoves Group PLC (1997) 
‘Going forward, Cantab will retain key commercial rights to provide both flexibility and 
greater financial return.’  
Cantab Pharmaceuticals PLC  
(1997) 
‘Importantly, we expect to produce solid profits and cash flow above the norms of our 
competition, whilst maintaining our capability to take advantage of improving markets.’  
Abacus Polar PLC (1997)  
‘I am confident that our carefully targeted expansion programmes across all our 
businesses will result in strong growth in earnings for the future.’  
Stagecoach Holdings PLC 
(1997)  
‘As with our previous acquisitions we expect them to benefit from being part of McBride 
and to be earnings enhancing during the forthcoming year.’  
McBride PLC (1998) 
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‘Superscape will invest these funds to continue to grow the company and move towards 
profitability.’  
Superscape VR PLC (1998)  
‘We are looking forward to the years ahead and are confident of generating major rights 
assets and of producing significant growth in earnings.’  
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC 
(1998) 
‘The development programme will concentrate primarily on large capacity key sites in high 
profile locations which have the potential individually to generate profits well in excess of 
the average bar or nightclub.’  
Chorion PLC (1998) 
‘Our focus on sales will ensure that the Group produces revenue growth and a return to 
profit and thus progressively build value for our shareholders.’  
IES Group PLC (1999)  
‘To match this investment in technology, we have also increased our sales and marketing 
activities and expect to see the benefits coming through in the near future.’  
Dee Valley Group PLC  
(1999)  
‘We believe that such opportunities combined with our 40eorganized UK operations will 
lead to improved levels of profitability.’  
Liberfabrica PLC (1999) 
‘A consistent focus on service quality, at sustainable margins, will contribute to long term 
profitable growth in this business.’  
Go Ahead Group PLC (1999) 
‘Future prospects look encouraging and we intend to take advantage of every opportunity to 
increase Group profits and earnings, and enhance value to shareholders.’  
Columbus Group PLC  (1999)  
‘However, the situation is now improving significantly and the company is moving towards 
profit and regaining the confidence of its retail and contract customers.’  
Mcbride PLC (2000) 
‘The winning of new contracts and the maintenance of existing relationships will ensure 
that SSS continues its positive contribution to the Group.’  
IES Group PLC (2000)  
‘It is our intention to continue to expand the sales of our testing services, which will bring 
the benefits of greater flexibility and additional income.’  
Dee Valley Group PLC  
(2000)  
‘Thus the Group is well placed for further acquisitions and profit growth in the future.’  Beale PLC (2000) 
‘Demand for our products remains buoyant and I am confident that the addition of further 
CD and DVD case capacity in the coming months should provide the opportunity to further 
increase turnover and profitability.’  
Coral Products PLC (2000) 
‘We shall be actively exploiting new growth opportunities to enhance the Group’s 
profitability.’  
Stoves Group PLC (2000)  
‘The business is building but will inevitably take time to achieve an acceptable return.’  Burnden Leisure PLC  (2001) 
‘We expect there to be benefits from increased capacity and improved efficiency.’  W T Foods PLC (2001) 
‘The Board is confident that the enlarged estate will continue to produce substantial returns 
in the years ahead’.  
Fuller Smith & Turner PLC  
(2001) 
‘We are confident that our significant investment in filtration and our strategic   strengths 
will produce a good and increasing return for shareholders, and a  rewarding environment 
for our employees and customers.’  
Mcleod Russel Holdings PLC 
(2001) 
‘Over the short term, profit growth will be constrained by the cost of investment.’  Boots Company PLC – (2002) 
‘This was achieved despite significant revenue investment in areas such as the Argos store 
card and new products at Experian, which will underpin future profits growth.’  
Great Universal Stores PLC 
(2002) 
‘We shall continue our ongoing strategy of using this surplus to buy back shares, in order to 
enhance long term growth in earnings per share.’  
Next PLC (2002) 
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EQ 5,459 0.063 0.044 0.067 0.000 0.478 
Panel B: Forward-looking disclosures (FDSCORE)  across situational incentives  
Variables  N Mean  Median  Diff. (mean) t-stat/(pvalue)  
Equity offerings      
SEO=1 927 2.560 2.095 (0.311) −4.49(<0.001) 
SEO=0 4,532 2.871 2.376   
Debt Issues       
DebtIssues=1 2,465 2.881 2.381 0.115 2.76(0.006) 
DebtIssues=0 2,994 2.766 2.290   
Earnings declines      
DECLINE=1 2,066 3.065 2.500 0.398 6.60(<0.001)  
DECLINE=0 3,393 2.667 2.200   
Missing analyst forecasts     
MISS=1 2,163 2.904 2.392 0.143 2.20(0.028)  
MISS=0 3,296 2.761 2.273   
Losses       
LOSS>1 638 2.749 2.094 (0.078) −3.30(0.001) 
LOSS<0 4,821 2.827 2.362   
Underperformance      
UNDERPERFORM=1 1,787 3.040 2.478 0.330 5.14(<0.001)  
UNDERPERFORM=0 3,672 2.710 2.246   
N 5,459     
Number of situational incentives among debt issues, earnings declines, missing analyst forecasts and 
underperformance compared to industry peers(DebtIssues=1,Decline=1, MISS=1, UNDERPERFORM=1) 
 N Mean  Median  Diff. (mean)         t-stat/(pvalue)  
0 995 2.529 2.091   
1 1,784 2.763 2.271 0.234 2.65(0.008) 
2 1,565 2.801 2.302 0.038 0.61(0.544) 
3 893 3.094 2.548 0.293 3.34(<0.001) 
4 222 3.563 3.075 0.469 3.09(0.002) 
 
Table 2 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable  N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
FDSCORE 5,459 2.818 2.326 2.180 0.000 12.903 
SIZE  5,459 11.912 11.773 1.829 7.840 17.156 
σSALES 5,459 0.257 0.147 0.340 0.002 2.651 
BM 5,459 0.624 0.475 0.583 −0.424 3.792 
NANAL  5,459 7.147 5.000 6.490 1.000 47.000 
DISPERSION  5,459 3.008 1.504 6.804 0.000 199.916 
SEO  5,459 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.000 1.000 
DEBTISSUES 5,459 0.452 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
DECLINE  5,459 0.378 0.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
MISS  5,459 0.396 0.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 
LOSS  5,459 0.117 0.000 0.321 0.000 1.000 
UNDERPERFORMANCE 5,459 −0.080 −0.036 0.438 −4.051 1.363 
Rt 4,321 0.092 0.090 0.473 −1.497 2.125 
Xt 4,321 0.010 0.006 0.188 −0.917 1.434 
Xt3 4,321 0.002 0.001 0.296 −2.074 1.732 
Rt3 4,321 0.148 0.155 0.694 −2.224 2.696 
AG 4,321 0.032 0.061 0.168 −1.424 0.408 
EPt−1 4,321 0.200 0.075 0.569 −0.608 5.452 
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Panel C:  Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations between key variables  
Variables  FDSCORE SIZE σSALES BM NANAL DISPERSION  EQ SEO DEBTISSUES DECLINE MISS LOSS 
UNDER-
PERFORMANCE
FDSCORE 1.000 −0.274 0.053 0.185 −0.177 0.022 0.004 −0.055 0.027 0.089 0.033 −0.012 0.073
SIZE  −0.249 1.000 −0.139 −0.297 0.820 −0.062 −0.160 −0.063 0.099 −0.019 −0.029 −0.172 −0.064
σSALES 0.104 −0.208 1.000 −0.111 −0.151 0.040 0.247 0.161 0.007 0.048 0.078 0.079 0.012
BM 0.191 −0.275 −0.173 1.000 −0.178 0.093 −0.116 −0.121 −0.061 0.173 0.061 0.083 0.099
NANAL −0.158 0.832 −0.200 −0.176 1.000 −0.071 −0.165 −0.079 0.086 −0.023 −0.040 −0.169 −0.038
DISPERSION  0.041 −0.100 0.140 0.160 −0.085 1.000 0.066 0.021 −0.031 0.192 0.091 0.186 0.027
EQ 0.000 −0.182 0.288 −0.130 −0.185 0.116 1.000 0.123 −0.013 0.016 0.047 0.120 −0.043
SEO  −0.063 −0.067 0.159 −0.147 −0.079 0.057 0.130 1.000 0.125 0.009 0.055 0.154 0.010
DEBTISSUES 0.038 0.105 −0.001 −0.054 0.095 −0.069 −0.026 0.125 1.000 −0.009 0.003 −0.071 −0.034
DECLINE  0.089 −0.026 0.074 0.167 −0.033 0.480 0.021 0.009 −0.009 1.000 0.278 0.253 0.058
MISS 0.030 −0.036 0.073 0.040 −0.057 0.195 0.051 0.055 0.003 0.278 1.000 0.239 0.022
LOSS −0.045 −0.178 0.086 0.009 −0.209 0.320 0.125 0.154 −0.071 0.253 0.239 1.000 0.143
UNDERPERFORMANCE 0.114 −0.111 −0.027 0.297 −0.045 0.174 −0.115 0.047 0.031 0.142 0.077 0.233 1.000
 Rt Xt Xt3 Rt3 AG EPt−1 FDSCORE 
Rt 1.000 0.183 -0.045 -0.073 0.157 -0.073 -0.107 
Xt 0.308 1.000 -0.227 -0.007 -0.007 -0.542 -0.057 
Xt3 −0.003 -0.153 1.000 0.186 -0.076 -0.139 -0.005 
Rt3 0.002 0.038 0.350 1.000 -0.133 0.019 0.024 
AG 0.189 0.136 -0.167 -0.069 1.000 0.043 -0.055 
EPt−1 0.008 -0.257 -0.041 0.069 0.053 1.000 0.050 
FDSCORE −0.111 -0.063 0.002 0.013 -0.059 0.145 1.000 
The sample consists of 5,459 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1,273 UK listed non-financial firms with available accounting, stock price and 
analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. 1,138 observations are eliminated when further requiring stock price data. The Appendix defines the 
variables. p-value corresponds to a Wilcoxon non-parametric test (two-sided) for the difference in means between the sub-samples. 
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Table 3 
The determinants of the frequency of forward-looking performance statements: information environment 
and situational incentives.  
Variables    
FDSCOREt−1  0.285*** 0.285*** 
  (9.00) (9.04) 
SIZE −0.321*** −0.223*** −0.251*** 
 (−8.54) (−6.93) (−7.35) 
σSALES 0.143 0.118 0.093 
 (1.57) (1.23) (1.02) 
BM t−1   −0.266*** 
   (−3.29) 
BM 0.166** 0.147** 0.301*** 
 (2.18) (2.06) (3.49) 
EQ −0.164 −0.532 −0.591 
 (−0.32) (−1.31) (−1.47) 
NANAL  0.017 0.018* 0.022** 
 (1.29) (1.82) (2.23) 
DISPERSION  0.013 0.013 0.011 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.37) 
SEO  −0.190*** −0.197*** −0.208*** 
 (−4.05) (−3.39) (−3.57) 
DEBTISSUES 0.220*** 0.163*** 0.154*** 
 (2.76) (3.08) (2.91) 
DECLINE  0.375*** 0.364*** 0.343*** 
 (5.28) (4.85) (4.90) 
MISS  0.089** 0.058 0.062* 
 (2.09) (1.54) (1.65) 
LOSS  −0.062 0.032 0.030 
 (−0.49) (0.32) (0.30) 
UNDERPERFORMANCE 0.097*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 
 (3.18) (4.27) (5.05) 
Year dummies  YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES 
    
Observations 5,459 4,824 4,824 
Adj. R2 0.1842 0.2617 0.2632 
The sample consists of 5,459 observations during the period 1996–2007 for 1,273 UK listed non-financial 
firms with available accounting and analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. 635 observations 
are eliminated when including lagged frequency of forward-looking performance statements. The 
Appendix defines the variables. The */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). 
We report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the frequency of
forward-looking performance statements (FDSCORE) on a dynamic factor and variables proxying for the 
firm’s information environment and situational incentives. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by year and firm to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelated residuals. 
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Table 4  
Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE), situational incentives  
and share price anticipation ofn  earnings.
 
 
Variables 
Entire Sample DebtIssues  
 
DebtIssues=1
Earnings 
declines 
DECLINE=1 
Missed 
expectations 
MISS=1 
Underperformance 
 
UNDERPERFORM=1
Multiple 
Situational 
Incentives  
Xt 0.543*** 0.485*** 0.393*** 0.482** 0.072 0.068 0.233 −0.001 
 (4.41) (4.86) (2.87) (2.03) (0.28) (0.38) (1.26) (−0.00) 
Xt3 0.055 0.028 −0.046 −0.019 −0.041 −0.121 0.021 −0.089 
 (1.07) (0.73) (−1.03) (−0.15) (−0.37) (−1.24) (0.24) (−0.61) 
Rt3 −0.039 −0.045 −0.044 −0.060 −0.069 −0.047 −0.081* −0.108** 
 (−0.82) (−1.09) (−1.09) (−1.35) (−1.63) (−1.25) (−1.82) (−2.21) 
AG 0.118*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.115*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.090*** 0.112*** 
 (3.27) (3.78) (3.77) (4.20) (2.88) (6.03) (4.09) (3.71) 
EPt−1 0.126 0.129 0.119 0.449** 0.089 −0.070 −0.006 −0.039 
 (0.86) (1.16) (1.03) (2.24) (0.65) (−0.61) (−0.04) (−0.23) 
FDSCORE   −0.013*** −0.011** −0.020*** −0.008 −0.015** −0.020*** 
   (−3.70) (−2.15) (−4.36) (−1.63) (−2.14) (−4.27) 
FDSCOREx Xt   0.027 0.065 0.040 0.085*** 0.037 0.047 
   (1.62) (1.02) (1.22) (4.96) (1.36) (1.25) 
FDSCORExXt3   0.024* 0.029 0.030* 0.028 0.021 0.031 
   (1.65) (1.16) (1.89) (1.20) (1.59) (1.28) 
Year Dummies  NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Dummies  
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  
Observations 4,321 4,321 4,321 2,000 1,567 1,671 1,352 841 
Adj. R2 0.0588 0.1242 0.1282 0.1615 0.1226 0.1331 0.1536 0.1816 
The sample consists of 4,321 observations during the period 1996-2007 for 1,056 UK listed non-financial firms with available accounting, stock price and analyst 
forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. The Appendix defines the variables. Multiple Situational Incentives include firm-year observations with at least two 
situational incentives among debt issues, earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and underperformance compared to the industry pears (DebtIssues,
DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). The Appendix defines the variables. The */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). We 
report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of annual stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings, the frequency of 
forward-looking performance statements within subsets of observations with situational incentives. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by year and firm to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
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Table 5  
Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE), situational incentives, earnings quality and share price anticipation of earnings.
 Entire Sample DebtIssues  
DebtIssues=1 
Earnings declines 
DECLINE=1 
Missed expectations 
MISS=1 
Underperformance 
UNDERPERFORM=1 
Multiple Situational 
Incentives 
Variables High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low 
Earnings 
quality 
High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low 
Earnings 
quality 
High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low 
Earnings 
quality 
High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low 
Earnings 
quality 
High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low 
Earnings 
quality 
High 
Earnings 
quality 
Low  
Earnings 
quality 
Xt 0.254** 0.489** 0.280 0.559* −0.114 0.246 −0.135 0.412 0.158 0.414 0.061 0.098 
 (2.16) (2.30) (1.25) (1.90) (−0.44) (0.77) (−0.81) (1.30) (0.61) (1.42) (0.22) (0.24) 
Xt3 −0.125 0.048 −0.153 0.052 −0.175 0.176 −0.262* 0.108 −0.044 0.187 −0.102 0.172 
 (−1.58) (0.58) (−1.09) (0.49) (−0.87) (1.01) (−1.85) (0.69) (−0.34) (1.39) (−0.60) (0.56) 
Rt3 −0.053 −0.027 −0.040 −0.073 −0.075 −0.048 −0.065* −0.024 −0.106** −0.035 −0.079* −0.112* 
 (−1.29) (−0.59) (−1.04) (−1.28) (−1.63) (−0.87) (−1.78) (−0.51) (−1.97) (−0.99) (−1.90) (−1.71) 
AG 0.087*** 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.109** 0.061** 0.110*** 0.091*** 0.119*** 0.036 0.176*** 0.020 0.162*** 
 (3.28) (3.31) (4.42) (2.50) (2.17) (3.27) (6.03) (10.43) (0.99) (5.72) (0.46) (5.51) 
EPt−1 −0.054 0.326* 0.076 0.734*** −0.075 0.414*** −0.185 0.297* −0.026 0.094 −0.103 0.554** 
 (−0.52) (1.86) (0.54) (3.31) (−0.41) (2.65) (−1.20) (1.78) (−0.16) (0.41) (−0.54) (2.27) 
FDSCORE −0.015*** −0.005 −0.005 −0.016** −0.016*** −0.019** −0.015*** −0.004 −0.016*** −0.009 −0.017** −0.013 
 (−3.21) (−1.63) (−0.76) (−2.23) (−3.79) (−2.32) (−3.72) (−0.39) (−2.67) (−0.84) (−2.24) (−0.92) 
FDSCORExXt 0.046** 0.023 0.164* 0.054 0.097* 0.014 0.120*** 0.043 0.063 0.001 0.103* 0.020 
 (2.32) (0.90) (1.80) (0.89) (1.78) (0.31) (3.34) (1.17) (1.59) (0.03) (1.93) (0.32) 
FDSCORExXt3 0.032* 0.012 0.055* 0.023 0.061* −0.000 0.071*** −0.010 0.027* 0.002 0.060*** −0.014 
 (1.77) (1.19) (1.85) (1.21) (1.65) (−0.02) (3.24) (−0.85) (1.67) (0.09) (2.64) (−0.29) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Dummies  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,173 2,173 1,043 957 812 755 855 816 667 685 411 410 
Adj. R2 0.1611 0.1742 0.1445 0.1941 0.1336 0.1479 0.1492 0.1511 0.1844 0.1827 0.2427 0.2167 
The sample consists of 4,321 observations during the period 1996-2007 for 1,056 UK listed non-financial firms with available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from Datastream and 
I/B/E/S.  Low EQ includes firm-year observations with EQ (inverse measure of earnings quality) lower than the industry and year median. High EQ includes firm-year observations with EQ (inverse 
measure of earnings quality) higher than the industry and year median. Multiple Situational Incentives includes firm-year observations with at least two situational incentives among debt issues, earnings 
declines, missing of analyst forecasts and underperformance compared to the industry pears (DebtIssues, DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). The */**/*** indicate significance at the 
0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). We report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of annual stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the 
frequency of forward-looking performance statements within subsets of observations with situational incentives. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and firm 
to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
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Table 6  
Earnings quality as a gauge of management credibility
  Multiple Situational Incentives 
Variables Low 
Earnings 
volatility 
High 
Earnings 
Volatility 
High  
Discretionary 
Earnings quality 
Low  
Discretionary 
Earnings quality
Low Analyst 
Coverage 
High Analyst 
Coverage 
High earnings 
quality 
Low earnings 
quality 
Low Analyst 
Dispersion 
High Analyst 
Dispersion 
Xt -0.103 0.285 0.036 -0.325 0.009 0.360 0.033 0.028 0.688 -0.194 
 (-0.29) (0.56) (0.17) (-0.60) (0.04) (0.81) (0.12) (0.07) (1.38) (-0.73) 
Xt3 -0.201 0.168 -0.046 -0.209 -0.042 0.247 -0.108 0.198 0.037 -0.112 
 (-1.09) (0.75) (-0.37) (-1.06) (-0.28) (0.89) (-0.67) (0.69) (0.24) (-0.75) 
Rt3 -0.137* -0.051 -0.148*** -0.075 -0.086** -0.173** -0.079* -0.116 -0.021 -0.104* 
 (-1.78) (-1.62) (-5.69) (-0.96) (-2.15) (-2.24) (-1.89) (-1.62) (-0.36) (-1.94) 
AG 0.116** 0.006 0.162*** 0.087** 0.144*** 0.085* 0.018 0.166*** 0.148 0.097* 
 (2.35) (0.16) (5.04) (2.23) (4.18) (1.85) (0.40) (5.40) (1.48) (1.74) 
EPt−1 -0.164 -0.049 -0.090 0.033 -0.012 0.790 -0.109 0.534** -0.085 -0.043 
 (-0.70) (-0.16) (-0.49) (0.07) (-0.13) (1.53) (-0.61) (2.20) (-0.51) (-0.24) 
FDSCORE -0.024*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.022** -0.015 -0.024*** -0.017** -0.017 -0.021* -0.018* 
 (-2.77) (-1.55) (-1.09) (-2.28) (-1.37) (-2.94) (-2.31) (-1.19) (-1.96) (-1.81) 
FDSCOREx Xt 0.074** -0.055 0.120*** 0.070 0.052 0.023 0.108* 0.019 -0.166 0.058 
 (2.39) (-0.68) (2.94) (1.45) (1.14) (0.24) (1.88) (0.33) (-1.21) (1.00) 
FDSCORExXt3 0.053* -0.023 0.065** 0.013 0.023 0.006 0.061*** -0.014 -0.127 0.035 
 (1.89) (-0.54) (2.19) (1.28) (0.74) (0.06) (2.70) (-0.32) (-1.60) (1.25) 
DISPERSION       -0.001 -0.015**   
       (-0.65) (-2.23)   
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
dummies  
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Observations 384 437 377 444 392 429 411 410 231 590 
Adj. R2 0.1989 0.1486 0.2971 0.1159 0.2102 0.1519 0.2346 0.2387 0.2109 0.1765 
The original sample consists of 4,321 observations during the period 1996-2007 for 1,056 UK listed non-financial firms with available accounting, stock price and analyst 
forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S. In this table we retain only 821 observations of firms facing multiple situational incentives. Multiple Situational Incentives 
includes firm-year observations with at least two situational incentives among debt issues, earnings declines, missing of analyst forecasts and underperformance compared 
to the industry pears (DebtIssues, DECLINE, MISS and UNDERPERFORM). The Appendix defines the variables. High (low) earnings quality includes firm-year 
observations with EQ (inverse measure of earnings quality) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. Low (high) earnings variability includes firm-year 
observations with firm specific earnings variability (σEARN) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. Low (high) analyst coverage includes firm-year 
observations where the number of analysts following the firm (NANAL) are below (above) the sample median. Low (high) analyst dispersion includes firm-year 
observations where the analyst forecast dispersion (DISPERSION) is below (above) the sample median. The */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-
tailed). We report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of annual stock returns on contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with
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the frequency of forward-looking performance statements within subsets of observations with situational incentives. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by year and firm to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
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Table 7  
Forward-looking disclosure (FDSCORE) and share price anticipation of earnings over time  
and across earnings quality
Variables Entire Sample  High Earnings quality Low Earnings quality  
Xt 0.433*** 0.290** 0.597** 
 (2.97) (2.03) (2.57) 
Xt3 0.007 -0.029 -0.007 
 (0.12) (-0.24) (-0.05) 
Rt3 -0.051 -0.057 -0.046 
 (-1.07) (-1.15) (-0.86) 
AG 0.103*** 0.058*** 0.129*** 
 (8.01) (2.66) (6.75) 
EPt−1 0.176* 0.081 0.318* 
 (1.77) (0.65) (1.68) 
FDSCORE -0.006 -0.010** -0.001 
 (-1.10) (-1.97) (-0.11) 
FDSCOREx Xt 0.026 0.186*** -0.031 
 (0.44) (3.39) (-0.69) 
FDSCORExXt3 -0.066 0.027 -0.004 
 (-1.35) (0.99) (-0.11) 
TIME 0.001 -0.006*** 0.010*** 
 (1.51)  (-10.28) (6.57) 
FDSCORE x Xt x TIME  -0.001 -0.023** 0.007 
(-0.05) (-2.42) (1.16) 
FDSCORExXt3 x TIME 0.013** 0.006 0.016*** 
 (2.26) (0.79) (3.15) 
    
Year Dummies  YES YES YES  
Industry Dummies  YES YES YES 
Observations 2,831 1,526 1,305  
Adj. R2 0.1369 0.1228 0.1475  
The sample consists of 2,831 observations during the period 1996-2007 for a sample of 394 UK listed non-financial
firms with at least five years available accounting, stock price and analyst forecast data from Datastream and I/B/E/S.
The Appendix defines the variables. High (low) earnings quality includes firm-year observations with EQ (inverse
measure of earnings quality) is lower (higher) than the industry and year median. TIME is a trend variable equal to the
difference between the current year and 1996. The */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-
tailed). We report the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of annual stock returns on
contemporaneous and future earnings interacted with the frequency of forward-looking performance statements and a
time trend. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by year and firm to control for cross-
sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
 
